What can comparing the last three election showdowns tell us about the current state of politics?
On the 12th December 2019 Britain held its first winter election since 1923, making it the fourth national poll in 5 years. The election was hardly a surprise, as the campaign had pretty much started with the Tory leadership campaign, in which the ability to defeat Jeremy Corbyn was central to each candidates platform.
The debate about why exactly Labour lost to the extent they did in the 2019 General Election will no doubt consume the debate about the future direction of the Labour party and more importantly (at least in the eyes of the media), who should lead it going forward. But to understand this we must first gauge what went right and wrong for each party in General elections 2015, 2017, and 2019.
I think we can learn a lot about how Labour could potentially win the 2024 GE by focusing on the last three elections, and focusing in on three crucial topics: Leadership, Europe, and Economic Offer.
2015- Cameron vs Miliband
In 2015 both main parties had leaders broadly striving for the same perceived leadership style, touting broadly the same economic policies, and both in favour of remaining in the EU, all but for Cameron making a referendum promise he thought he’d never have to deliver. 2015 also marked the end, at least for now, of ‘one nation conservatism’, New Labour’s ‘third-way’ centrism, and the Liberal Democrats.
Leadership:
The conversation about what makes a “strong leader” is problematic in itself. If the election of Boris Johnson is anything to go off, “strong leadership” is attributed as anyone (usually a man) who displays authoritarian-style rhetoric and ambitions. I would say the challenge Labour have going forward is avoiding the trap of arguing about leadership on anyone’s terms but their own.
David Cameron first popularized the now exhausted slogan “strong and stable leadership” to great effect. Leaving aside the fact that any upper-class man with a posh accent is automatically perceived as more “prime ministerial” simply by fitting the mold of so many previous prime ministers, great champion of the center-ground and moderate Labour MP Ed Miliband fell into Cameron's trap by trying to outdo David Cameron at his own game. Responding to accusations of weak leadership, Miliband tried, woefully unsuccessfully, to play the tough statesman: “am I tough enuss t-tough enough? Hell yes I’m tough enough’. Cameron's attraction was that he emanated traditional codified traits associated with British Prime Ministers: a presence on the world stage, well-spoken and articulate orator, and being ‘above the fray’ of the lesser, “chaotic” politicians.
The leadership of a party leader can’t help but be somewhat defined by their opposing number. The dynamic between Miliband and Cameron was the bully/bully-victim. Instead of refusing to engage with Cameron’s personal attacks, childish heckling, and triumphant twattery, Miliband tried to beat him at his own game, and failed miserably. Having the affect and idiosyncrasies of a softer, gentler, more bookish man, Miliband tried -unconvincingly- to recreate and master Cameron's ‘epic put-down’ style of debate at the dispatch box. A setting that lends itself perfectly well to Cameron, who always seemed comfortable humiliating a nerdy boy in front of his Eton alumni. Needless to say that in this category, Miliband never had a chance.
EU:
In the years 2010-2015 Nigel Farage had come to dominate British political discourse. Seemingly omnipresent his disdainful and incredulous tones permeated the airwaves of every media outlet in the country, and apparently there was nothing we could do about it. By the time 2015 rolls around, and the question on everyone's minds should have been things like: “why have we still got half the deficit left when you said it would be gone in 5 years?” or “was it really worth selling off the governments RBS shares at a £7Billion loss?” or maybe “why are food banks now a fact of life for millions of people in work?” The topic of the day was IMMIGRATION. A low-flying panic attack swept the country as everyone suddenly became extremely concerned about the fact that there were people here who used to be somewhere else. And whilst it may seem obvious that there could be some link between massive public spending cuts and deregulation on the one hand and lower living standards on the other. The narrative taking off was that wages are low NOT BECAUSE employers were paying their workers the minimum they could get away with, but because immigrants were taking those jobs and therefore suppressing wages. That class sizes were growing NOT BECAUSE local schools budgets had been slashed by a third and teachers were quitting in droves from stress, but because there were Polish kids who had the gall to go to school.
Over the election campaign Labour capitulated unconvincingly to UKIP's anti-immigration message, most famously with a series of red mugs adorned with the phrase ‘controls on immigration’. However, aside from being plainly stupid, this new anti-immigration ‘vibe’ was incompatible with the desire to stay in the EU and was thus added to the long list of the missteps by Miliband’s Labour.
Economics:
This was a non-starter for Labour. By pledging to do austerity but slower and not quite as vindictively, Labour had endorsed Cameron’s flawed logic that the national economy is like a household, and we have to cut back public spending to ‘balance the books’. Even capital investment; investment in infrastructure, was avoided by Labour in order to gain back the perception of ‘economic competence’ despite all evidence showing that investment in things like rail, energy, and education always yields dividends. On this sorry platform, Labour never had a chance.
2017- May vs Corbyn
Here we have the first instance of a party trying unsuccessfully to copy the strategy of its last successful campaign, without taking any of the events since into account. Something we’ll see Labour do two years later.
Leadership:
Theresa May took Cameron’s ‘strong and stable’ mantra and beat to death any effectiveness it once had with sheer repetition. Cameron’s strategy of contrasting his leadership style with Miliband’s was effective because Miliband went along with it, gave into the one upmanship, and was subsequently one-upped. Aside from Theresa May not possessing any of the confidence or charisma of her predecessor, she was also fighting a very different leader in Jeremy Corbyn, who didn’t try to emulate the politics of Blair, Cameron, Clegg, Miliband, but stood in stark opposition to that. Against Corbyn’s authentic and new style of leadership, May’s robotic and empty slogans had no effect. It was the immaterial vs the material. Slogans vs new ideas.
EU:
By this point it was a year since the EU referendum and political lines had been redrawn by the leave-remain dichotomy. May told the country that she had called the 2017 GE to strengthen her hand in the EU negotiations to get the best deal. She also happened to be 20 points ahead in the polls at this point. Both politicians went into the election on a pro-leave manifesto, and secured between them 86% of the vote. This should have been an indication to MPs that at this point in time the British Public had accepted that Brexit was going to happen, and were casting their vote based on other policies.
Economics:
The manifesto pledges of May’s Tories and Corbyn’s Labour could not have been more binary. Though neither leader was particularly popular, and neither had a Brexit deal yet, Labour had a coherent set of popular policies. Policies that existed as a result of Labour winning the argument on austerity. By this point the country had got wise to the scam pushed by Cameron and Osborn that cutting investment would improve anything, and wanted to see investment in public services go up. Johnson understood this, May did not. On economic policy Labour had a clear advantage over the now discredited austerity agenda. How can you argue that GDP must come before anything else whilst also proposing to leave the EU? You can’t, it was time to change tact.
2019- Johnson vs Corbyn
By 2019 we had both parties trying to learn from the failings and successes of 2017, to wildly different results. Boris learned the lessons from Theresa May: yes he needed a big majority to get Brexit through, but to get that majority he needed to offer more than Brexit, he needed to offer what Corbyn had offered: hope, vision, and the promise of a new chapter in British politics . The Labour campaign on the other hand appeared to have learned nothing. Boris made an adjustment to the economic offer, the biggest failing of May’s campaign. Labour made an adjustment to it’s Brexit offer, what we now know in hindsight to be the strength of their 2017 campaign.
Leadership:
By 2019 we had a face off between Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn, two massively unpopular candidates. So this category should have canceled itself out as having any relevance to voters decisions. But whilst on the one hand we had Boris Johnson, fresh from a landslide leadership race and back from Brussels with a new brexit dea, on the other we had Jeremy Corbyn, fresh from a new antisemitism row and with an economic message that, whilst bigger and more radical than the last, was no longer a unique selling point in the way it had been previously, as Boris had switched to being a champion of ending austerity and pouring money into schools and hospitals.
EU:
By this point in time the specter of the Lib Dems had scared labour into adopting, slowly and painfully, a remain position. Though party frontbenchers would term it a ‘final say’, the only people in the country who wanted a second vote were people who wanted to remain. Labour went into this election with the same socialism and the same leader, but had made the switch from leave to remain. As a result of this, they were in no position to challenge Boris’ new brexit deal as all they had was a vague promise of a ‘jobs-first’ brexit, negotiated by a leader who wouldn’t say whether he even wanted to leave or remain. ‘Get Brexit done’ was an offer of sweet relief to a country sick to death of talking about it, and 17.4 million Brits, including 4 million Labour voters enraged that their collective command was in danger of being overturned by the Labour Party, were up for it.
Economics:
Though Labour's tax and spend policies were far bigger and much further-reaching than Boris’, they were seen as both being parties of spending and the NHS. In addition to this, the salience of Brexit and Labour's perceived ‘betrayal’ of it superseded economics in the minds of many voters. Brexit was no longer a matter of sovereignty, immigration, or trade, but a matter of principle, of democracy, of respect.
Part Two: what next?
By working within the model of Leadership, Brexit, and Economics we should be able to deduce from a strategic point of view the direction Labour should take into the 2020s.
Leadership:
We have in Boris Johnson a leader vindicated by a majority of 80 seats. A leader promising a new golden age for Britain. Tapping into nationalist sentiments of ‘greatness’ and dominance. In a country where 54% of people view the British Empire as a positive thing, this could go a long way. We also have a leader so slippery he has managed to detach himself from the toxicity of austerity and is portraying this latest administration as a ‘new dawn’ for Britain.
What I would take away from their massive 43% vote share is that, whilst labour may have won the argument on austerity, the public are happy for the Conservatives to manage post-austerity Britain. The next leader needs to be someone the country sees as patriotic, but again, not on the Tories terms. Patriotism need not be nationalism, love for one’s country need not be coupled with hate for another’s.
Parting with Jeremy Corbyn provides the opportunity to step away from all the baggage he brought with him. His perceived sympathies for ‘Britain's enemies’ were dragging Labour down. Labour need someone people see as championing Britishness, but in a different way, someone who loves their country and therefore wants to look after it.
EU:
Though the leave/remain argument is finally over, politicians identities as leavers and remainers will haunt them for years to come. Being a remainer does not simply mean you voted to remain, but that you fought to overturn the result, that you are an enemy of democracy and part of the ‘liberal elite’. This is an identity that holds significance in the minds of voters and needs to be navigated with care. In an alternate universe, Corbyn’s historic euroscepticism could have been a major advantage, had the party not reneged on it’s 2017 promise to leave.
Economics:
Though the right-wing media are already trying to attribute the blame for 2019 to Corbyn’s socialism, the success of the 2017 manifesto and the subsequent capitulation of the Tories to increased spending clearly shows this claim to be disingenuous. The next leader should not give in as Ed Miliband did to media pressure to adopt ‘centrism’.
We can clearly see from the last three elections that the winning combination is an untested, energetic leader; an economic offer to the middle and working classes, and a willingness to support the referendum result. This may seem obvious now, but there are still those who would seek to blame Labour’s economic offer over it’s defiance of the leave vote.
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